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his paper attempts to study the impact that foreign 
education has on corruption. Over the past decades 
there has been a wave of globalization that has 
resulted both in greater economic and trade 
interdependence and in the confluence of cultures and 
ideologies. One of the evidences of this globalization is the 
increase in the number of students that are educated in a 
foreign country. Despite the increasing resources dedicated 
to financing foreign education, little research has been done 
on the impact that foreign-educated individuals have on 
corruption in their home countries. Do these students play a 
role in reducing corruption at home? This paper attempts to 
fill this gap in the literature by using a unique dataset that 
includes information for recipient and sending countries for a 
ten-year time frame.  
 The increasing number of scholarships and fellowships 
that are dedicated to funding foreign education is a testament 
to the increasing importance of this type of education 
worldwide in the past few decades. Numerous institutions in 
the United States were founded under the belief that foreign 
education fosters multicultural understanding and democratic 
values. The Fulbright program was created in 1946 in order 
to “increase mutual understanding and promote leadership 
development through learning and international 
cooperation.”1 Since then, thousands of foreign and U.S 
citizens have been able to study and do research abroad. 
However, the impact of this program on the students’ home 
corruption levels has never been studied. 
T 
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 The American efforts to promote foreign education are 
supported by other Western countries like Germany. The 
German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) is the largest 
grantor of academic support in the world. They offer 
financial assistance to more than 55,000 students that belong 
to academic elites to experience education abroad and be 
exposed to other cultures and ways of thinking.2 
 Non-Western countries have also shown an interest in 
promoting foreign education among their citizens. For 
instance, the governments of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and 
Singapore have created scholarship programs to grant their 
top students access to the most prestigious universities 
around the world.3 
 However, despite the increase in scholarship programs 
for education abroad, there is little to no statistical evidence 
that they have the desired impact within the host or origin 
countries. This paper attempts to provide empirical evidence 
that reinforces the importance of foreign education. The 
purpose of the present study is to identify the impact that 
foreign students have on the levels of corruption in their 
home countries. That is, I seek to investigate whether being 
exposed to a more transparent business environment and 
better business ethics allow students to reduce corruption at 
home. The model used in this analysis uses corruption in the 
sending countries as the dependent variable. To capture the 
impact of foreign education on corruption, I create an 
interaction term with the percentage of students abroad 
normalized by the total number of individuals receiving 
tertiary education in the sending countries and an index of 
host country corruption. This index is calculated as a 
weighted average of corruption in the recipient countries, 
where the weights are the number of students that go to from 
country A to country B at time t.  
 I find that the coefficient for the interaction term is 
positive and significant in all the specifications of the main 
model. These findings suggest that sending students to 
receive tertiary education in countries with lower corruption 
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than their own might lead to lower corruption levels in their 
own country. For instance, students from Somalia who 
receive a foreign education in the United States (where 
corruption levels are much lower) seem to help reduce the 
corruption levels in Somalia. Investigating the modes  
through which this influence may take place is beyond the 
scope of this paper, but I will provide a possible hypothesis 
that is compatible with the available findings.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section II provides an overview of the literature with a focus 
on the importance of education to combat corruption. Section 
III provides a description of the data and the theory. Section 
IV presents the empirical analysis and model specification. 
Section V analyzes the results. Section VI presents the 
sensitivity analysis. Section VII concludes. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 The literature on corruption is very extensive and 
there are existing debates on its definition, its determinants, 
and ways to prevent it. Many researchers have focus their 
analysis mainly on political corruption. However, in this 
paper, I adopt a more holistic interpretation by using the 
definition provided by the PRS group when calculating the 
International Country Risk Guide index. Corruption is a 
threat to foreign investment that distorts the economic and 
financial environment, negatively impacts the efficiency of 
the government and businesses through nepotism and 
ultimately introduces an inherent instability into the political 
process. Some forms of corruption include: bribe payments 
in financial transactions, secret party funding in the political 
sphere, [please add at least one more form of corruption]. 4 
Danila Serra develops a study on corruption 
determinants that uses the Leamer’s Extreme Bounds 
Analysis. Her paper analyzes economic, socio-cultural and 
institutional variables that can affect corruption. Serra 
concludes that variables such as ethno linguistic 
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fragmentation and colonial heritage are significant corruption 
determinants in addition to the already established ones that 
refer to political regime, economic freedom or regulatory 
quality.5 This paper will follow Serra’s multidisciplinary 
approach to corruption by factoring in the determinants she 
identifies. 
On the other hand, the negative correlation between 
education levels and corruption is very well documented. 
Munzert develops a multidisciplinary approach to corruption. 
In his paper, he demonstrates that countries with a highly 
educated populace (defined as university level and above) 
have lower levels of corruption. That is, more education 
leads to less corruption. In addition, he adds that a decrease 
in the education gap between the higher and the lower classes 
in society also alleviates corruption.6  
Ellie Keen also addresses the relationship between 
education and corruption. Her report establishes a negative 
correlation between these two variables and it convincingly 
advocates for stronger educational programs. In addition to 
this, she defends the idea of including more anti-corruption-
specific lectures within the study of philosophy, civics, and 
human rights.7 
In-classroom education is not the only important 
determinant. Ponzetto and Schliefer focus their study on the 
necessary conditions for the development of democracy. 
When referring to education, they conclude that the content 
of education is not as important as the socializing experience 
of studying with other students and learning to interact. 8 
The conclusions in Glaezer, Ponzetto and Schliefer on 
education are particularly important to the theory I present in 
this paper: that students receiving a foreign education help 
reduce corruption back at home. This hypothesis relies on the 
idea that the general educational experience, the interaction 
with other individuals with different mentalities, and the 
exposure to other business environments are more valuable 
than anti-corruption-specific education.  
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 As demonstrated by the literature, there is common 
agreement on the ability of education to reduce corruption. 
When focusing specifically on foreign education, however, 
the existing literature is far more limited. The majority of 
such studies focus on the impact of international student 
mobility on the host countries, as opposed to on the sending 
countries. Altbach developed a comprehensive study that 
emphasizes the value of foreign education. He alludes to the 
scholarship program created by the Chinese government 
during the Cold War. This program allowed students to 
receive an education in the former Soviet Union, where they 
would learn about the communist system and its structure to 
later help China with its implementation. 9 
 More recent studies of foreign education include 
Antonio Spilimbergo’s analysis of impact of foreign 
education on democracy. He concludes that an increase in the 
number of students receiving tertiary education abroad (in 
more democratic countries) has a positive impact on the 
democracy levels of their home countries.10 The present 
study develops a similar model to that of Spilimbergo. 
 This paper attempts to contribute to the growing body 
of literature on foreign education by analyzing its impact on 
corruption in the sending countries. This will provide support 
for the establishment of more scholarships and fellowships to 
finance study abroad as a way to foster intercultural 
communication and prevent the spread of corruption. 
 
III.  DESCRIPTION OF THE DATA 
 
III.1 Data sources 
 
 In order to carry out my study, I created a dataset using 
three independent datasets that measure corruption, the 
number of students receiving a foreign education, and a 
number of other control variables such as GDP, democracy, 
and education, which are relevant to the model. Below I 
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  For the purpose of this study I use the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG)’s measure of corruption 
developed by a private institution called the PRS Group. It is 
one of the most comprehensive corruption datasets and has 
often been used in the literature.11 
 The dataset includes corruption for all countries from 
1998 to 2010. The ICRG measure of corruption ranks 
countries on a scale of one to six, where six is least corrupt. 
This index primarily looks at corruption within a political 
system by focusing on nepotism, secret party funding, and 
other such factors, but it also tackles forms of financial 
corruption that can potentially force the withdrawal of 
foreign investment from a country. This includes special 
payments or bribery related to trade licenses, exchange 
controls, police protection, tax assessments, and loans.12 
 
Students studying abroad 
 
 The data on the number of students studying abroad is 
obtained from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Statistical Yearbook. 
The database is selected for the period between 1998-2010 
and it provides information on the international mobility of 
students in the third tier of education (university education 
and higher). The data are produced by the host countries and 
for each one there is information on the number of students 
they received from a total of approximately 140 sending 
countries.  
 For the purpose of this study, I designated 31 countries 
as the host countries (recipient countries). Table 1 presents 
the selected countries.  
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Table 1. Host Countries 
European Union Countries Non-EU Countries 
Austria Luxembourg Hungary Norway 
Belgium Germany Slovakia Switzerland 
Portugal The Netherlands Poland Russia 
Spain Denmark Latvia Canada 
France Slovenia Lithuania United States 
United Kingdom Italy Estonia  
Ireland Malta Finland  
Bulgaria Greece Sweden  
Romania Cyprus   
* The Czech Republic is not included as part of the recipient countries due to 
complications with the data. 
 
 The United States, Canada, and the European Union 
have traditionally been top recipients of foreign students due 
to the quality of their education, their history, and their 
culture. In addition, the selected countries have relatively low 
levels of corruption compared to the foreign students’ 
countries of origin. Using this selection allows me to better 
interpret the results of the analysis by looking at countries 
where the corruption differential between recipient and 
origin countries is above zero in the majority of the cases. 
This selection keeps the results unbiased because these 
countries concentrate the vast majority of foreign students 
from everywhere in the world. All countries for which 
information is provided in the UNESCO dataset are included 
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Quality of Governance 
 
 The additional control variables included in these 
regressions are obtained from the Quality of Governance 
dataset. This comprehensive time-series dataset is collected 
by the Quality of Governance Institute at the University of 
Gothenburg in Sweden and it comprises information from 
other individual datasets. The dataset includes information 
for 192 countries and it has approximately 202 variables with 
data ranging from 1946 to 2010.14 For the purpose of this 
study the years are limited from 1998-2010. 
 
III. 2 Description of variables 
Dependent Variable 
(1) Corruption levels (scaled). “Levels of corruption in 
the sending countries as measured by the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG).”  
The initial measure ranks countries from zero to six. 
However, for the purpose of this study this variable is on a 
zero to one scale, where zero is most corrupt and one is least 
corrupt.  
Main Independent Variables 
In order to arrive to robust conclusions, I include three main 
independent variables. 
(1) Share of students going abroad over the total number 
of students receiving tertiary education. “Share of the 
number of students that go study abroad from 
country A at time t over the number of students in 
country A at time t that receive tertiary education (for 
every sending country)”: 
 
 
 The information of the number of students receiving a 
foreign education from every sending country is obtained 
from the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook. The tertiary 
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education data is obtained from the quality of governance 
data. This variable alone will account for the impact that an 
increasing share of students going abroad has when they go 
to countries where the difference in corruption is zero--that 
is, to countries where the levels of corruption are equal to 
those in the sending country. 
(2) Corruption index in recipient countries. “Index of 
corruption of the host countries where students 
receive foreign education”  
 For this model, thirty-one countries have been selected 
as recipient (host) countries, all of which have low but 
varying degrees of corruption. To account for this 
heterogeneity in the corruption levels of the host countries, I 
have created an index for the average level of corruption in 
the host countries. This index is calculated as the sum of the 
weighted average of the difference in corruption between 
host country A and sending country B at time t (for every 
sending country and time from 1998-2010). The weighted 
averages are determined by the number of students that go 
from B to A at time t.  
 
 
Where  is the number of students from country A 
to B at time t over the total number of students that go abroad 
from country A at time t. This share is multiplied by the 
difference in corruption between the recipient country (B) at 
time t and the sending country (A). This coefficient measures 
the corruption in isolated countries that do not send any 
students to study abroad.   
 
(3) Foreign students and recipient country corruption. 
“It is an interaction variable that measures the impact 
that students have on corruption when they receive 
an education in a less corrupt foreign country” 
 
 
 For this paper, this interaction term is the most 
important variable. It represents the impact that an increasing 
number of students receiving education in less corrupt 
countries has on the levels of corruption in their home 
countries. The direction and the significance of this impact 
will lead to the main conclusion of this paper. 
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the main independent 
variables previously described.  
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics Of Main Independent Variables 
Variable Observations Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Index of corruption in 
recipient countries 
1767 .2473653 .204311 -.360574 .976666
6 
Share of students 
studying abroad*Index of 










Other Independent Variables 
 The remaining independent variables are control 
variables that help establish causation between the 
independent and the dependent variables. These are variables 
that the corruption literature has established as significant 
corruption determinants and therefore need to be included in 
the model specification in order to avoid omitted variable 
bias.  
 There is abundant literature on the determinants of 
corruption. For the purpose of this study, I will use Serra as a 
model of the control variables to include in my analysis. She 
develops a study on the determinants of corruption and 
classifies them into institutional, economic and socio-cultural 
  
 
Foreign Students and Corruption Index = Share of Students Studying Abroad
                                                                                               *
                                                                Corruption Index in Recipient Countries
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variables.15 Table 3 show the control variables I use, 
classified according to these three categories 
.  
Table 3. Control Variables 
Economic 
variables 
Institutional Variables Socio-cultural 
variables 
GDP per capita Levels of democracy Colonial heritage 
Levels of Economic 
Freedom 
Percentage of the population 
receiving tertiary education 
 
Regulatory quality Freedom of press  
 Political instability  
 
Because these variables are obtained from the Quality of 
Governance dataset that combines other individual datasets, 
Table 4 offers a more detailed description of the control 
variables, including their sources and how they are measured. 
Finally, Table 5 provides the summary statistics for the eight 
chosen control variables.  
 
Table 4. Description of control variables 
Variable Code 
name 
Database source Measure 




GDP per capita converted to 
constant 2005 international 








Weighted average from 0-100 
(highest) of 10 different 
freedoms including (business, 
IPR, labor). All freedoms have 
the same weight. 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Wbgi_rqn World Bank 
Governance 
Indicators (World 
Incidence of market-unfriendly 
policies and perceptions of the 
burdens imposes by excessive 
regulations in trade, business 
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Bank) etc.  
Democracy 
Levels 
Fh_polity2 Freedom House Levels of democracy measured 













Percentage of students receiving 




Fh_press Freedom House Index created adding 4 
component ratings: laws and 
regulations, political pressures 
and controls, economic 
influences, and repressive 








Combines several indicators 
which measure perceptions of 
the likelihood that the 
government in power will be 





Henisz – The 
Political 
Constraints Index 
Classification of former colonial 
ruler of the country. It is 
focused on Western “overseas” 
colonialism. The ranking goes 
from 0-10. 0 is never colonized. 
Colonial powers include Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, France, The 
Netherlands, US, UK, Belgium, 












Table 5. Summary Statistics Of Control Variables 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP per 
capita 
1925 10532.43 12482.41 185.2988 74028.08 
Economic 
Freedom 
1404 58.21265 12.5149 3 90.12804 
Regulatory 
Quality 
1886 7.797985 3.085693 1 13 
Democracy 
Levels 





1394 2.907762 15.85522 .0246778 590.4932 
Freedom of 
Press 
2283 46.12571 24.77169 0 100 
Political 
Stability 
1893 6.703645 2.85009 1 12 
Colonial 
Heritage 
2652 3.063725 2.730317 0 10 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
 The present study attempts to show that sending 
students to receive tertiary education in a foreign country 
with comparatively less corruption reduces corruption in the 
students’ home country. When studying abroad, students 
have the opportunity to receive an education (regardless of 
the subject) in countries where transparency and honesty are 
potentially more valued than at home. In addition, the 
students network and interact with other classmates and are 
potentially exposed to better business ethics and a generally 
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more transparent business environment. Living abroad and 
being exposed to less corrupt environments give students the 
opportunity to reduce the levels of corruption in their home 
countries. Investigating the ways through which this might 
take place is beyond the scope of this paper; however 
potential hypotheses will be provided in the concluding 
remarks.  
 In order to study the correlation between corruption and 
foreign education, I mainly use Pooled and Fixed Effects 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimations. As explained 
above, the main dependent variable is the ICRG measure of 
corruption and the main explanatory variables are the share 
of students studying abroad over the total population 
receiving tertiary education, a corruption index of recipient 
countries and the interaction between these two variables. 





Where  is the level of corruption in time t and country i is 
measured by the International Country Risk Guide. Control 
Variables include other corruption determinants that are 
listed in section III including GDP per capita, levels of 
economic freedom, freedom of press and democracy levels. 
The interpretation of the coefficients of the control variables 
will be presented in the following section along with other 




V.1 Primary Model Specification 
 
 This section provides a thorough analysis of the results 
obtained from the different regression specifications. I use 
two different estimation techniques: pooled OLS and fixed 






Cit = Share of Students Abroadit + Index of Corruption in Receiving Countries it +
(Students Abroad it * Index of Corruption in Receiving Countries it ) +Control Variablesit
+Country Fixed Effects i + Time Fixed Effectst +  i t
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variables are correlated while the fixed effects OLS controls 
for country and time-fixed effects. I run ten different 
regression specifications ((I)-(IX)) for each technique that 
progressively incorporate the different corruption 
determinants discussed above. For a clear and successful 
interpretation, it is worth restating that corruption as a 
dependent variable is measured on a zero to one scale where 
one is least corrupt. That is, a positive correlation in this case 
is translated as causing a decrease in corruption.  
 
Corruption and Foreign Education 
 
 Table 6 presents the regression results without 
controlling for country or time-fixed effects. The variable for 
the share of students studying abroad is negative and 
significant in the majority of regression specifications. The 
coefficient remains highly significant at the 1 percent level in 
the majority of specifications. The index of corruption in 
recipient countries is very persistent; the coefficient is small 
but it remains negative and highly significant at the 1 percent 
level (p-value of 1.29E-126 with all determinants included) 
all throughout the specifications. On the other hand, as 
hypothesized, the interaction variable between the share of 
students abroad and the corruption index in recipient 
countries remains positive and significant (at the 10 percent 
level) in all but one specification. 
 Table 7 shows very similar results for the main 
independent variables. Here the type of estimation used is 
fixed effects OLS, which controls for country and time. The 
results of these estimations are therefore robust to country-
specific, time-invariant characteristics, including ethnic 
composition, colonial ties (this is why the colonial heritage 
variable is dropped), geographical variables and many other 
unobservable characteristics. In this case, the share of 
students abroad remains negative and significant in all but 
one of the regression specifications. The index of corruption 
in recipient countries is also persistent with very low p-
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values (5.88859E-32 in specification (VIII)) and thus very 
significant at the 1 percent level. In addition, the interaction 
variable remains positive in all specifications as well as 
highly significant at the 1 percent level. The interaction has a 
p-value of 0.00028 in the complete model that includes all 
corruption determinants showing the strength of the results. 
 The share of students is interpreted as the impact that 
sending students abroad to receive tertiary education has on 
corruption when the corruption differential index is zero. 
That is, when the corruption difference between country A 
(sending) and country B (recipient) is zero, the effect that 
sending students from country A to country B is negative. 
One of possible reason for this result is that students going to 
study abroad to countries with the same levels of corruption 
are exposed to a similar type of environment and business 
ethics. This education would be no different from the one 
they receive at home in terms of transparency of the 
environment. Students might then be encouraged to behave 
in the same way as the officials and/or businessmen in their 
home countries. In the case of very corrupt countries, this 
leads to the perpetuity of corruption and a worsening of the 
conditions. In addition, one needs to take into consideration 
the impact of “brain drain.” Students that go abroad are 
within those who receive tertiary education in the sending 
country. They are usually the best and brightest. When they 
go abroad, this signifies a big loss for the country and a slow 
down in the potential for development and economic growth 
and an increase in the chances for corruption. This could 
explain the negative coefficient for this variable, which 
fulfills the expectations of my hypothesis. 
 The index of corruption in the recipient countries 
remains negative and significant in all specifications. This 
coefficient measures the impact that not sending any students 
abroad has on the levels of corruption in the home country. 
That is, if country A does not send any students abroad, 
corruption in country A will increase. A potential reason for 
this finding is that a country that does not send any students 
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abroad is more likely to be very isolated from the world 
economy, globalization and progress. It is therefore 
reasonable to predict that this isolation and lack of 
interaction with other nations will lead to increasing levels of 
corruption in the country, since there is very limited 
development and growth. This isolationism principle can 
provide a good explanation for the persistent negative but 
significant coefficient of the corruption index variable which 
is consistent all throughout the analysis. 
 The interaction term between the share of students and 
the corruption index of recipient countries captures the 
essence of this paper. This coefficient explains the impact of 
an increasing share of students going abroad to receive 
tertiary education to countries where there are lower levels of 
corruption. In this case, the coefficient for this variable is 
consistent; it remains positive in all the regression 
specifications as well as relatively highly significant. This 
possibly indicates that an increase in the share of students 
from country A that go to country B where B is a less corrupt 
country that A, leads to lower levels of corruption in A. That 
is, there is evidence that foreign education in less corrupt 
countries reduces corruption in the home country.  
 As hypothesized, there is evidence that sending 
students to study abroad in less corrupt countries leads to a 
decrease in corruption in the home country. The persistence 
of the positive and statistically significant coefficient 
throughout the different specifications shows the robustness 
of this finding.  
 
Other corruption determinants 
 
 The control variables included were added on the basis 
of the literature that focuses on corruption determinants. In 
the Pooled OLS estimation regressions, the economic 
variables "GDP per capita" and "Economic Freedom" are 
both positive and significant. This means that richer 
countries are less subject to corruption. Also an increase in 
177Journal of Politics & Society 
economic freedom, which comprises trade, business, 
investment, and property-rights freedom, also leads to lower 
levels of corruption.  
 On the other hand, democracy levels seem to be 
consistently significant and positively correlated with 
corruption (p-value of 0.043 when all determinants are 
included). This result is widely accepted in the literature, 
where higher levels of democracy are often associated with 
lower corruption. The variable for the regulatory 
environment has both a negative and significant impact on 
corruption. That is, more regulations lead to more corruption. 
This could be a consequence of the increased opportunity for 
bribery and rule transgression in a highly-structured system. 
Despite the positive impact of foreign education and the 
general trend observed in the literature, the variable for 
tertiary education remains negative and significant. An 
argument could be made that higher levels of education lead 
people to have higher positions of power, and thus more 
opportunities for corrupt behavior. Researchers Peñalosa and 
Van Ypersele study corruption, education, and output. They 
point out that, although education is not necessarily 
detrimental for corruption, more education leads to higher 
output and thus more rents that can be obtained from corrupt 
behavior.16 
  The variable "Freedom of Press" is negative and 
significant in all the specifications. This variable is measured 
on a zero to one hundred scale where one hundred is least 
free. That is, a negative coefficient indicates that more media 
freedom is correlated with lower levels of corruption, which 
is consistent with the literature findings. "Political Stability" 
is also positively correlated with corruption (p-value of 
0.041), which means that a country with a stable government, 
that is, one unlikely to be overthrown or threatened by 
terrorism, has lower levels of corruption. The possible 
mechanism behind this result is that more stability allows for 
better business practices, less risk of investment, and more 
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social stability. All of this contributes to the reduction in 
corruption.  
 Lastly, "Colonial Heritage" remains positive and 
significant at the 10 percent level. Countries that used to be 
colonies generally have lower levels of corruption. In his 
analysis, Daniel Treissman looked at the impact of colonial 
history and established that most British colonies have lower 
levels of corruption.17 Serra corroborates the significance of 
the variable by including a control for former British 
colonies.18 
 The fixed effects estimation in Table 7 shows the same 
signs for all coefficients. "Economic Freedom" and 
"Democracy" remain significant and positive. "GDP per 
capita" shows a negative sign but remains insignificant in 
five out of seven regressions. "Political stability" remains 
positive and significant while "tertiary education" loses all 
significance. When controlling for time-invariant fixed 
effects, some of the changes in these variables might already 
be partially accounted for. This would explain the loss of 
significance. 
 The additional variables included generally behave 
according to what the literature has already established. This 
emphasizes the validity of the data, and it supports the main 
conclusion of this paper. That is, the interaction term 
between the share of students and the corruption index of 
recipient countries is a statistically significant determinant of 
corruption. Therefore, receiving a foreign education appears 
to be relevant to reduce corruption.  
 
V.2 Lagged regressions 
 
 An additional hypothesis about education and 
corruption is that the effect of receiving a foreign education 
can be lagged. That is, the impact that students may have on 
their home countries may be delayed. Students may need 
time to set up businesses, become important officials in the 
government or other institutions through which they could 
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potentially influence corruption in their home countries. In 
order to account for this effect, I develop a model that 
includes lags of the aforementioned independent variables. In 
this case, I selected a five year lag since I considered this to 
be enough time for a business to flourish or for a person to 
gain enough work experience to be promoted to a more 
influential position. In addition, the limitation of a ten year 
time series dataset prevents me from lagging for more than 
five years without losing a significant amount of 
observations. 
 Table 8 presents the results of the regressions 
specifications with a pooled OLS estimation including the 
lagged independent variables for five years. In this case, the 
main independent variables lose most of their significance. 
The share of students studying abroad remains mostly 
negative but loses its significance in seven of the eight 
specifications. The interaction variable between the share of 
student abroad and the index of corruption in the recipient 
countries also remains positive in the majority of 
specifications but statistically insignificant with high p-
values reaching 0.746. However, the index of corruption in 
recipient countries is persistent; the coefficient is negative 
and significant in all specifications, which confirms that the 
isolationist argument prevails even in the lagged model.  
 In terms of the other independent variables, the 
economic variables (GDP per capita, economic freedom and 
regulatory quality) are all positive and significant. Levels of 
democracy appear to be positive and significant in two of the 
five regressions where it is included. The variable reflecting 
tertiary education levels loses all significance with colonial 
heritage. Political stability remains positive and significant, 
reinforcing the argument that countries where there is 
historical political stability have lower levels of corruption. 
The majority of these results match those obtained in the 
general regression models without lags included. 
 However, when analyzing Table 9 the results change 
dramatically. Table 9 uses a fixed effects OLS estimation and 
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includes lagged variables for five years. The results show 
that the share of students studying abroad is mostly positive 
but completely insignificant. In addition, the index of 
corruption in recipient countries now shows a positive and 
significant coefficient. This would indicate that having been 
in an isolationist state at time t-5 reduces corruption five 
years later. A potential interpretation is that countries in 
isolationism have the capacity for strong development and 
growth once they join the global economy. In this case, it 
may be that a country that was in an isolationist position in 
the year t-5, abandons this state and joins the global 
economy. Through new regulatory methods, increasing 
investment, and more democratic regimes, its corruption then 
decreases at time t. Surprisingly enough, the coefficient for 
the interaction is significant in the majority of the regressions 
(p-value of 0.054), but it shows a negative sign. This means 
that when controlling for fixed effects, an increase in the 
number of students studying abroad at time t-5 has a negative 
impact on the corruption at time t. This might be due to a 
reversal in the education ideals obtained abroad after being 
exposed once again to the lack of transparency (assuming 
they return to the home country). More specifically, one 
could interpret this negative coefficient as representing the 
resignation of individuals following the established system as 
opposed to fighting against it. That is, they perpetuate 
corruption because of the hardship of working for a change 
and the ultimate benefits one can obtain from corrupt 
behavior.  On the other hand, there is an immediate loss of 
significance in all control variables. This indicates that when 
we control for time invariant changes, the impact of all 
variables including GDP per capita or levels of democracy 
lose all effect on the levels of corruption. For instance, the 
GDP per capita in the year 2000 in country A does not have 
an impact on the corruption levels of country A in 2005. The 
same rationale applies to all the control variables.  It is worth 
pinpointing that the regressions in Table 9 have an unusually 
low adjusted R squared, ranging between 0.09 and 0.13. This 
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might be a sign of omitted variable bias that indicates that 
when testing for lags one needs to consider other variables 
outside of the previous specification. This may be skewing 
the results from this model specification, which cannot be 
considered robust. 
 Based on Table 8 and Table 9, there is robust evidence 
that the effect of sending students to receive tertiary 
education abroad on corruption is relatively immediate given 
the insignificance in most of the variables in the lagged 
regressions and the potential for a reversal in educational 
values.  
  In conclusion, the results that prove to be the most 
robust are those presented in Table 6 and Table 7. These 
indicate that the share of students studying abroad 
(normalized by the number of students that receive tertiary 
education) has a negative impact on the corruption at home. 
The corruption index of recipient countries, which is a 
weighted average of the differences in corruption between 
sending country and recipient country at time t, is also 
negative. However, the interaction between these two 
variables, and the key variable under study, remains positive 
and significant throughout the pooled and fixed effects 
specifications. This provides robust evidence that, as 
hypothesized, promoting foreign education in countries 
where the corruption levels are lower than at home, leads to 
less corruption in the home country. Foreign education 
appears to have a relatively immediate effect on corruption. 
 
VI. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
 In order to strengthen my results, I address potential 
issues of endogeneity and the concern over stay rates that 








 The existent debates on the determinants of corruption 
and the rationale for foreign education give rise to concerns 
about endogeneity.  
Omitted Variable Bias 
 Omitted variable bias as a form of endogeneity is 
addressed in this paper with the inclusion of control variables 
the literature has proved to be significant determinants for 
corruption. As mentioned above, I include the variables that 
Serra, in her study on corruption determinants, establishes as 
significant when measuring corruption. These variables are 
GDP per capita, levels of economic freedom, quality of 
regulations, level of democracy, freedom of the press, level 
of political stability, and colonial heritage. The percentage of 
tertiary education over the total population is also added 
because of its importance for foreign education.  
 While the existence of other country-specific, time-
varying omitted variables cannot be ruled out, these variables 




 Reverse causality is the other potential source of 
endogeneity in this analysis. Overall, corruption has often 
been referred to as a push factor for migration. People decide 
to leave their home countries because of economic and 
political lack of transparency that often lead to higher 
unemployment, low economic growth, and other similar 
factors. Marie Hadamovsky develops a study in which she 
empirically analyzes the determinants of migration. She 
concludes that countries with higher levels of corruption 
have greater labor outflows. That is, corruption leads to more 
immigration.19 
 However, overall in the literature of migration and 
corruption there is no reference made to international student 
mobility. Given the increasing number of students able to 
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receive a foreign education, literature emerged on both the 
value of this education for home and host countries, as well 
as the rationale for this migration. In his book on the 
internationalization of higher educational, Kemal Guruz 
establishes several reasons why students might decide to go 
study in a foreign country. He determines both pull and push 
factors for this phenomenon. As pull factors, he states that 
the quality of education abroad is a major consideration. 
Students tend to attend universities that are known for 
providing a high quality education. Spoken language and 
colonial ties with countries like Spain, France, or the United 
Kingdom are also prime factors that affect a student’s 
decision to study abroad. Networking has recently been 
appointed as a new consideration that contributes to the 
increase in international student mobility. More importantly, 
countries in Europe are now offering packages to attract 
international students to their institutions, which constitutes 
powerful pull factor.20 
 On the other hand, push factors seem to be less 
relevant. The quality of the educational system at home is 
possibly one of the major push factors that drive for the 
internalization of education. Political and economic 
conditions, however, are hardly mentioned as a determinant 
to receive foreign education. Even though these may also be 
influential, according to the literature, they are not the prime 
drivers. Behind the argument of seeking good quality 
education is the understanding that education potentially 
leads to better jobs and thus a better life.  
 Spilimbergo also develops a brief empirical model for 
the determinants of international student mobility.21 Like 
Guruz, Spilimbergo identifies the quality of education as 
being a highly significant consideration for foreign 
education. Colonial ties and spoken language are also very 
strong factors.  
 Overall, there is no substantive evidence that indicates 
that international education is majorly driven by corruption. 
Other considerations such as quality of education, spoken 
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language, and networking are more important in the decision 
to go study in a foreign country.  
 The support of the literature decreases the risk of 
endogeneity due to reverse causality and therefore 
strengthens the conclusion that foreign education helps 
decrease corruption. 
 
VI.4 Stay rates 
 
 Foreign-educated students may have an impact on the 
corruption of their home countries both if the stay abroad and 
if they return home. There has been abundant literature that 
looks at the influence of diasporas on trade and investment 
between countries where there is abundant bilateral 
migration. However, the effect on corruption is likely to be 
greater if the student returns to the home country and is able 
to start a business, become a government official, or 
otherwise assume a position of power.  
 Measuring stay rates has proven to be very complicated 
because there is no systematic dataset on the number of 
students that return to their home countries. George Borjas 
reports that between 1971 and 1991, over three million 
people received student visas for the United States but only 
393,000 received permanent visa status at the end of their 
studying period.22 This indicates that stay rates are not as 
high as is often believed. In his study, Michael Finn states 
that stay rates were increasing until the 1990s and then they 
started going down.23 According to William Glaeser, 
students maintain a strong attachment to their home countries 
that ultimately forces them to return.24  
 In his analysis, Spilimbergo provides a table that shows 
the stay rates for foreign doctorate recipients in the United 
States.25 The following table reproduces the results.  
 Based on this table, large countries like China and 
India have the lowest return rates, while smaller countries 
like Spain have low stay rates. Perhaps students coming from 
less populous countries have an incentive to go back home 
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stay rates in 
1992 
Percentage of non-US doctorate 
recipients intending to stay in the United 




2,268 42.4 57.3 
India 1,995 87.5 88.2 
South Korea 1,943 15.1 59.0 
China 1,649 91.1 90.8 
Brazil 255 21.1 36.0 
Mexico 223 30.8 39.8 
Chile 57 26.1 54.4 
Turkey 252 43.7 55.3 
Indonesia 119 16.4 … 
Italy 106 37.1 62.0 
Greece 276 49.1 70.0 
Spain 87 34.0 62.0 
Canada 430 55.1 64.2 
Argentina 67 44.7 62.5 
Colombia 66 28.5 57.5 
Total, all 
countries 
14,189 53.5 69.1 
(Without India 
and China) 
10,545 38.8 59.5 
*Source: Finn (2001), Table 32 from the doctorate recipients from U.S. 
universities (2005), and Spilimbergo (2009)  
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because they have a better chance to having impact on the 
political and business methods of their home countries, while 
students from countries with large populations do not.  
 In conclusion, there is evidence that stay rates for the 
majority of countries do not surpass fifty percent. This means 
that students are very likely to go back to their home 





 Abundant private and public funds are now being 
directed towards scholarships and fellowships that promote 
foreign education all over the world, not only in Western 
countries, but also in Asian and Arab countries. Are their 
resources being well spent? 
 This paper addresses this question by examining the 
impact that foreign-education has on the levels of corruption 
in a students' home country. To evaluate this relationship, I 
use a comprehensive data set that includes data on 
international student mobility since 1998 and covers the 
majority of the countries in the world. In addition, I use a 
robust index of corruption compiled by the International 
Country Risk Guide. Using this dataset, I have shown that an 
increase in the share of students going abroad to less corrupt 
countries appears to reduce corruption in the sending 
country. This study presents strong evidence for a negative 
correlation between foreign education and corruption.  
 When running lagged estimations, I find that there is 
no significant impact of foreign education on corruption after 
5 years, which indicates that any relationship between 
international education and corruption appears to take place 
within the first two years of studying abroad. However, the 
issue of lagged regression estimation due to potential omitted 
variable bias reduces the robustness of this particular 
regression estimate.  
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 The robustness of the correlation between foreign 
education and corruption suggests that there might be a 
causal relationship between the share of students studying 
abroad in less corrupt countries and the reduction in 
corruption at home. This paper contributes to the literature on 
the value of foreign education and provides empirical 
evidence that supports the development of scholarship 
programs and institutions dedicated to international 
education to promote intercultural understanding as well as 
to develop more transparent systems in every country.   
 In addition, this paper makes a contribution to the 
corruption literature by suggesting a new anti-corruption 
strategy that relies on the promotion of foreign educational 
programs. This finding is particularly beneficial for countries 
like the United States, where anti-bribery laws have been 
seen as a threat to the competitiveness of certain industries in 
the global market. In the United States, the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, passed in 1977, makes it unlawful for U.S. 
citizens to participate in any type of bribery or corrupt 
behavior. This includes the bribing of foreign officials. The 
fact that this type of laws only affects some businesses has 
put many American and European multinationals at a 
disadvantage since they can be accused and charged if they 
are suspicious of corrupt behavior. Given the robustness of 
my findings, the United States should consider treating 
foreign education as a tool to reduce corruption in the world. 
The funding of scholarship programs such as Fulbright will 
not only improve multicultural understanding but it can 
prevent and reduce corruption and thus potentially benefit 
American corporations. With the reduction in corruption, 
companies will be able to do business in countries where 
they were previously uncompetitive due to anti-bribery laws. 
The same prescription applies to other countries, particularly 
countries in the European Union, where anti-bribery laws 
have also been approved.  
 Ultimately, the mechanisms by which foreign 
education may reduce corruption remains uninvestigated. As 
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mentioned before, this analysis is beyond the scope of this 
paper. However, I have proposed one such mechanism that is 
compatible with the available evidence. Students who receive 
an education abroad tend to be the academic elite in their 
countries, and are therefore most likely obtain top positions 
in both the public and private sectors in their home countries. 
This gives these foreign-educated individuals the opportunity 
to exercise their power and progressively change the corrupt 
system towards more transparent practices. Future research 
should focus on investigating the channels through which 
foreign education may reduce corruption.  
 Finally, this paper has provided statistical evidence that 
foreign education may impact levels of corruption. This 
finding suggests that countries should consider encouraging 
more students to attend higher education in a foreign country. 
This will not only promote intercultural understanding and a 
more cosmopolitan society, but it appears that it may also 
foster the more transparent environment necessary for 
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Appendix 1. TABLE 6  
Dependent Variable: Levels of corruption as measured by ICRG 


























































Share of students 
abroad*Corruption 



















GDP per Capita  -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
  (0.00000)*** (0.00000)*** (0.00000)*** (0.00000)*** (0.00000)*** (0.00000)*** (0.00000)** 
Economic Freedom 
Index 












   
Regulatory Quality    0.01799 0.01959 0.01846 0.02946 0.03002 
    (0.00165)*** (0.00170)*** (0.00171)*** (0.00288)*** (0.00304)*** 
Democracy (Freedom 
House/Polity) 








     
Freedom of the Press      0.00119 0.00115 0.00121 
      (0.00035)*** (0.00034)*** (0.00036)*** 
Political Stability       -0.01392 -0.01430 
       (0.00318)*** (0.00322)*** 
Colonial Origin        0.00168 
        (0.00189) 
Constant 0.38163 0.45359 0.67543 0.61408 0.58280 0.47356 0.46349 0.44839 
 (0.00887)*** (0.01256)*** (0.03544)*** (0.03991)*** (0.03571)*** (0.04899)*** (0.04804)*** (0.04948)*** 
Time and Country 
Fixed Effects 
No No No No No No No No 
Adjusted R-squared 0.65 0.68 0.68 0.71 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.74 
Number of 
Observations 
1,752 1,404 1,111 863 830 830 830 830 
 
Appendix 2. TABLE 7. Fixed Effects  
Dependent Variable: Levels of Corruption as measured by ICRG 




















































Share of students 
abroad*Corruption 

















GDP per Capita   0.00001 0.00001 -0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 
  (0.00000)*** (0.00000)*** (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) 
Economic Freedom 
Index 










   
Regulatory Quality    0.02144 0.02095 0.02092 0.02401 
    (0.00209)*** (0.00209)*** (0.00212)*** (0.00472)*** 
Democracy (Freedom 
House/Polity) 






     
Freedom of the Press      0.00004 0.00010 
      (0.00075) (0.00077) 
Political Stability       -0.00416 
       (0.00525) 
Constant 0.40673 0.30745 0.29895 0.30080 0.36099 0.35843 0.34074 
 (0.00984)*** (0.02970)*** (0.05450)*** (0.04278)*** (0.05093)*** (0.06503)*** (0.07011)*** 
Time and Country 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.48 0.54 0.54 0.58 0.60 0.60 0.60 
Number of 
Observations 
1,752 1,404 1,111 863 830 830 830 
 
Appendix 3. TABLE 8. Lagged Variables  
Dependent Variable: Levels of corruption as measured by ICRG  
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Share of students 
abroad t-5*Corruption 



















GDP per Capita t-5  -0.00001 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00001 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
  (0.00000)*** (0.00000)*** (0.00000)*** (0.00000)*** (0.00000)*** (0.00000)*** (0.00000)*** 
Economic Freedom t-5   -0.00493 -0.00505 -0.00360 -0.00313 -0.00290 -0.00289 
   (0.00047)*** (0.00058)*** (0.00057)*** (0.00058)*** (0.00058)*** (0.00059)*** 
Regulatory Quality t-5    -0.00298 -0.00370 -0.00545 0.00767 0.00754 
    (0.00225) (0.00241) (0.00245)** (0.00385)** (0.00394)* 
Democracy (Freedom 
House/Polity) t-5 








     
Freedom of the Press 
t-5 






      
Political Stability t-5       -0.01676 -0.01668 
       (0.00451)*** (0.00455)*** 
Colonial Heritage t-5        -0.00038 
        (0.00229) 
Constant 0.47881 0.57144 0.85682 0.87480 0.87229 0.69371 0.68043 0.68397 
 (0.00948)*** (0.01159)*** (0.02810)*** (0.03564)*** (0.03427)*** (0.05513)*** (0.05490)*** (0.05612)*** 
Time and Country 
Fixed Effects 
No No No No No No No No 
Adjusted R-squared 0.26 0.43 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.56 
Number of 
Observations 
1,503 1,261 1,063 815 785 785 785 785 
Appendix 4. TABLE 9. Lagged Variables-Fixed Effects  
Dependent Variable: Levels of corruption as measured by ICRG 
*Significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. Robust standard errors clustered in parentheses. The sample comprises data from 1998-2010. 
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Share of students 
abroad t-5*Corruption 

















GDP per Capita t-5  -0.00001 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00000 
  (0.00000)*** (0.00000)*** (0.00000)*** (0.00000)*** (0.00000)*** (0.00000)** 
Economic Freedom t-5   -0.00469 -0.00500 -0.00353 -0.00305 -0.00283 
   (0.00053)*** (0.00073)*** (0.00041)*** (0.00041)*** (0.00035)*** 
Regulatory Quality t-5    0.00099 0.00076 -0.00061 0.00772 
    (0.00328) (0.00402) (0.00410) (0.00812) 
Democracy (Freedom 
House/Polity) t-5 






     
Freedom of the Press 
t-5 




      
Political Stability t-5       -0.01351 
       (0.00810) 
Constant 0.46996 0.55915 0.83250 0.82646 0.81927 0.63307 0.64281 
 (0.01076)*** (0.01015)*** (0.02716)*** (0.02190)*** (0.02039)*** (0.02664)*** (0.03015)*** 
Time and Country 
Fixed Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-squared 0.29 0.44 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.56 
Number of 
Observations 
1,503 1,261 1,063 815 785 785 785 
